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Abstract
We revisit the adoption of voluntary export restraints (VERS) in
the di¤erential Cournot game with sticky price and intraindustry trade
by Dockner and Haug (1991). The analysis relies on linear and nonlin-
ear feedback strategies, to encompass the special cases considered in
Fujiwara (2010) and to show that a VER may arise in correspondence
of any free trade equilibrium generated by feedback information such
that competition is at least as strong as under open-loop rules. This
result can be interpreted in the light of the dynamic formulation of
conjectural variations due to Dockner (1992).
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1 Introduction
The impact and desirability of output restrictions has been lively discussed in
the literature on intraindustry trade, from two main standpoints. The rst,
at least since Bhagwati (1965) and Shibata (1968), considers the equivalence
between tari¤s and quotas (see also Itoh and Ono, 1982, 1984; and Hwang
and Mai, 1988). The second is instead concerned with the possible adoption
of a restrictive practice by exporting rms, in the form of voluntary export
restraints (VERs). The initial results in this vein date back to Harris (1985)
and Mai and Hwang (1988), establishing that VERs can be observed at
equilibrium if and only if the initial free trade equilibrium is more competitive
than the Cournot equilibrium (hence, typically, VERs should be observed
under price competition). Indeed, Mai and Hwang (1988) nd that the VER
is irrelevant, as its adoption leads to exactly the same industry output as
under free trade.
These authors, as well as a number of others (Eaton and Grossman, 1986;
Krishna, 1989; Bjorksten, 1994; and Suzumura and Ishikawa, 1997, among
others) use static models, in which the kind (and intensity) of market com-
petition is characterised through the instrument of conjectural variations
(Bresnahan, 1981; Kamien and Schwartz, 1983). The limited ability of con-
jectural variations in capturing the dynamic nature of competition and there-
fore also rms incentives to adopt unilateral restrictions induces Dockner and
Haug (1991) to investigate anew the issue of VERsadoption in a di¤eren-
tial Cournot game with sticky prices à la Simaan and Takayama (1978) and
Fershtman and Kamien (1987). Dockner and Haug (1991) conne their at-
tention to the limit game in which rms use linear feedback strategies and
the speed of price adjustment is innitely high, to prove that, in such a case,
the VER is indeed spontaneously adopted by the exporting rm, as it induces
an output restriction by the domestic rm. As a result, both rmsprots
increase as compared to the free trade equilibrium. Hence, in contrast with
Mai and Hwang (1988), Dockner and Haug (1991) show, although in a single
case, that VERs can be observed under Cournot competition if dynamics (in
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this case, price dynamics) is accounted for. A qualitative appraisal of their
result can be spelled out as follows. The spontaneous adoption of VERs by
exporting rms requires the absence of precommitments (which is embodied
in their analysis of the limit game under linear feedback rules), while it cannot
arise when commitment is called for, to sustain the open-loop solution.
A partial extension of their analysis is in Fujiwara (2010), accounting for
the linear feedback solution for any speed of price adjustment and the special
case in which the continuum of nonlinear feedback strategies collapses onto
the tangency solution. Relying on these two cases and the open-loop one,
Fujiwara (2010) shows that the VER can be observed at equilibrium under
the linear feedback solution, while this cannot happen in correspondence of
the degenerate nonlinear feedback equilibrium; additionally, the VER has
no impact at all on relevant magnitudes at the steady state reached under
open-loop information.
We revisit the model using linear and nonlinear feedback strategies, with
no restrictions on the speed of price adjustment, to obtain the following
results. First, the open-loop steady state equilibrium can be attained using
a nonlinear feedback strategy. Second, the degenerate nonlinear feedback
equilibrium corresponding to the tangency point between the highest isocline
of either rm and the steady state locus divides the set of steady states
generated by feedback rules into two subsets, the rst including all stable
equilibria (from that yielded by the stable linear strategy to the tangency
point), the second including unstable ones (from the tangency point to the
steady state reached along the unstable linear strategy). Third, the rst of
these two sets is further partitioned into two parts by the open-loop steady
state, produced by a specic nonlinear strategy, which delimits the portion
of stable equilibria in correspondence of which the foreign rm has a strict
incentive to spontaneously adopt the VER. Since the open-loop equilibrium
can be reproduced through nonlinear feedback strategies, the interpretation
of the VER in terms of precommitment or the lack thereof (Fujiwara, 2010,
pp. 101-102) may be reformulated in terms of the intensity of competition
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under the full spectrum of stable feedback strategies: any initial free trade
equilibrium generated by feedback rules at least as competitive as the open-
loop ones is bound to induce the adoption of the VER; the opposite holds
instead for feedback equilibria more collusive than the open-loop one. This
interpretation is in line with Dockners (1992) analysis of dynamic conjectural
variations, whose sign signals the emergence of an equilibrium which is bound
to be more (respectively, less) competitive than the open-loop (or, in the
limit, the static) one, when the conjectural variation is negative (positive).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The model is laid
out in section 2. Section 3 describes the continuum of symmetric feedback
equilibria under free trade. The analysis of the foreign rms incentive VER
and its consequences on equilibrium magnitudes is in section 4. Concluding
remarks are in section 5.
2 The setup
As in Dockner and Haug (1991), consider a two-country world in which coun-
tries are labelled as h (home) and f (foreign). A single rm is based in each
country, and has an analogous index. Firm f exports to country h and
competes against the local rm à la Cournot, in a duopoly existing over
t 2 [0;1) : Market price evolves according to

p(t) = s [bp(t)  p(t)] (1)
where bp(t) = a   q1(t)   q2(t) denes the notional inverse demand func-
tion and parameter s 2 [0;1) measures the speed of price adjustment (and
therefore is an inverse measure of price stickiness). Transportation costs are
assumed away. Hence, the instantaneous prot function of rm i = f; h is
i (t) =

p (t)  c  qi (t)
2

qi (t) (2)
and the same rm i must therefore
max
qi(t)
i =
Z 1
0

p (t)  c  qi (t)
2

qi (t) e
 tdt (3)
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subject to the state equation (1) and the initial condition p (0) = p0 > 0.
The discount rate  > 0 is common to both rms and time-invariant. Hence,
the model is initially exactly the same as in Simaan and Takayama (1978)
and Fershtman and Kamien (1987), but is interpreted as a description of
an intraindustry trade scenario with homogeneous goods. Throughout the
ensuing analysis, rms are assumed to operate under feedback rules, either
linear or nonlinear, although the open-loop solution of the free trade case
will also play a crucial role.
3 Free trade
The open-loop and linear feedback solutions of the free trade game can
be quickly dealt with, as they replicate those appearing in Fershtman and
Kamien (1987). Under open-loop information, the steady state levels of mar-
ket price and individual output are8>>>><>>>>:
pOL =
a (2s+ ) + 2c (s+ )
4s+ 3
> c
qOL =
(a  c) (s+ )
4s+ 3
(4)
with
lim!0 qOL = lims!1 qOL =
a  c
4
= qCN
lim!1 qOL = lims!0 qOL =
a  c
3
= qpc
(5)
The limits appearing in (5) - together with the analogous limits of pOL;
omitted for brevity - show that the, if either discounting or price stickiness
is absent, open-loop steady state replicates the static Cournot-Nash out-
come; while if either discounting or price stickiness is innitely high, then
the open-loop equilibrium collapses onto the perfectly competitive outcome.
While Dockner and Haug (1991) focus their analysis to the limit game where
s ! 1; here we shall outline the properties of feedback equilibria for any
admissible value of s.
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The linear feedback solution can be characterised following the same
method used in Tsutsui and Mino (1990) and Rowat (2007).1 Firm i must
solve the following HJB equation (henceforth, we will omit the time argu-
ment):
Vi (p) = max
qi
n
p  c  qi
2

qi + V
0
i (p)s (bp  p)o (6)
where Vi (p) is the value function and V 0i (p) =
@Vi(p)
@p
: The rst order condi-
tion can be solved w.r.t. the partial derivative of the value function:
p  c  qi   sV 0i (p) = 0 =) V 0i (p) =
p  c  qi
s
: (7)
Plugging this expression into (6), imposing symmetry and rearranging the
HJB equation, one obtains
V (p) =
3q2 (p)  2p2 + 2a [p  q (p)  c] + 2c [p+ q (p)]
2
(8)
where individual output appears as a function of price. Di¤erentiating (8)
w.r.t. p, we have
V 0 (p) =
a  c+ 2p  [a  c  3q (p)] q0 (p)

(9)
where we can use the expression (7) for V 0(p) so as to rewrite (9) as follows:
q0 (p) =
as+ c (s+ ) + q (p)  p (2s+ )
s [a  c  3q (p)] (10)
Before proceeding, it is worth noting that (10) implies that q0 (p) = 0 at
q0 (p) =
p (2s+ )  as  c (s+ )

(11)
and q0 (p)! 1 as
q (p)! q1 = a  c
3
= qpc (12)
1See also Shimomura (1991), Dockner and Long (1993), Fujiwara (2008), Lambertini
and Mantovani (2014, 2016) and Lambertini (2016), among others.
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Now, in view of the linear-quadratic form of the game, we may stipulate
a linear form for the symmetric control variable, whereby q (p) = p+ ; in
such a way that (10) becomes
s [a  c  3 (p+ )]  [as+ c (s+ ) + q (p)  p (2s+ )]
s [a  c  3 (p+ )] = 0 (13)
whose numerator is nil (provided the denominator is not) in correspondence
of the pairs (; ) solving the following system:8<:3s2 +   2s   = 0(3s + )  + a (1  ) s+ c [(1 + ) s+ ] = 0 (14)
i.e.,
 =  a (1  ) s+ c [(1 + ) s+ ]
3s + 
 =
 
q
(6s+ )2   12s2
6s
(15)
so that qLF (+) is increasing in p, while qLF ( ) is decreasing in p. Using
the two alternative expressions, the coordinates of the corresponding steady
state points are 8>>>><>>>>:
qLFss (+) =
(a c)
h
6s+5+
p
(6s+)2 12s2
i
3
h
8s+5+
p
(6s+)2 12s2
i
pLF (+) = a  2qLF (+)
(16)
and 8>>>><>>>>:
qLFss ( ) =
(a c)
h
6s+5 
p
(6s+)2 12s2
i
3
h
8s+5 
p
(6s+)2 12s2
i
pLF ( ) = a  2qLF ( )
(17)
There remains to characterise the continuum of nonlinear feedback so-
lutions. Without replicating the construction of the di¤erential equation
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which generates the innitely many nonlinear solutions, which is illustrated
in Tsutsui and Mino (1990), we conne ourselves to stress its basic features
and present the resulting picture in the state-control space. The continuum
is partitioned into two subsets of stable and unstable solutions by the tan-
gency point between a specic isocline and the steady state locus

p = 0; i.e.,
qss = (a  p) =2; whose slope is @q
ss
@p
=  1=2.
This implies that such a point is identied by q0 (p) =  1=2 or, using (10)
with q (p) = qss, by

s
+
3a+ 2c  5p
2 (a+ 2c  3p) = 0() p
T =
2 (a+ 2c) + s (3a+ 2c)
5s+ 6
(18)
and the corresponding output
qT =
a  pT
2
=
(a  c) (s+ 2)
5s+ 6
(19)
Note that
lim
!0
qT = lim
s!1
qT =
a  c
5
(20)
which is the output each rm would produce in the static maximization of
joint prots (i.e., the static cartel solution). In general, as the speed of price
adjustment increases or discounting decreases, the tangency point approaches
the static fully collusive outcome.
For any positive and nite values of s and ,
qLFss (+) > q
OL > qT > qLFss ( ) (21)
while clearly the opposite sequence holds for the corresponding prices.
The stability properties of the state-control system are described in Fig-
ure 1, which shows trajectories in the quantity-price quadrant, where both
linear feedback strategies are depicted. The stable linear feedback strategy
is qLF (+) ; producing the stable steady state at A: The other steady state
point at B is unstable instead. The point T is unstable as well, as is in-
dicated by the arrows along the isocline tangent to the steady state locus.
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However, the upper isocline intersecting twice the stability locus tells that
any intersection between the steady state locus and one among the innitely
many nonlinear feedback strategies at a point belonging to the segment AT
is indeed stable (while the opposite applies to any intersection in the segment
TB).
Figure 1 The phase diagram under free trade
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A last remark to which we will return in the remainder. The bullet
along

p = 0 identies the open-loop steady state point. As already noted by
Tsutsui and Mino (1990), every stable steady state equilibrium (generated
by nonlinear feedback strategies) at any point in the open interval between
OL and T denotes a collusive outcome, as individual output is below both
that associated with the stable feedback equilibrium and that characterising
the open-loop one.
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4 Voluntary export restraint
Here we assume that rm f adopts a voluntary export restraint by xing its
output at some qf = q 2
 
qLFss (+) ; q
T

throughout the game. As a result,
the home rm solves a problem in which q is in fact an additional exogenous
constant. Firm h must solve
Vh (p) = max
qh
n
p  c  qh
2

qh + V
0
h(p)s (a  qh   q   p)
o
(22)
To begin with, we characterise the home rms linear feedback strategies,
this time using the method of undetermined coe¢ cients. The rst order
condition is analogous to (7) and can be solved to obtain
qh = max fp  c  sV 0h(p); 0g (23)
For all c 2 (0; p  sV 0h(p)) ; substituting qh = p   c   sV 0h(p) into the above
expression and stipulating that Vh (p) = "1p2 + "2p + "3 yields the usual
system of three equations to be solved for the coe¢ cients "1; "2 and "3. This
procedure yields:
"1 =
4s+ 
q
(4s+ )2   4s2
4s2
(24)
"2 =
c (1  2s"1)  2s"1 (a  q)
2s (s"1   1)   (25)
"3 =
c (c+ 2s"2) + s"2 [2 (a  q) + s"2]
2
(26)
The resulting linear feedback strategies can be written as
qLF = p  c  s
 
2"1 + "2

(27)
and it can be easily checked that both lead to the same steady state, at which
the equilibrium price level is
pLFss (q) =
(a  q) (2s+ ) + c (s+ )
3s+ 2
(28)
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and intuitively qLF  = p   c   s
 
2" 1 + "2

is stable, while qLF  is unstable.
The foregoing discussion proves
Lemma 1 The adoption of a VER by the foreign rm causes the contin-
uum of nonlinear feedback solutions characterising the free trade setting to
disappear altogether.
The intuition is elementary: since the competitors output is xed, the
home rm behaves as a monopolist on the residual demand function, and this
intuitively makes the feedback solution unique (at least in a linear-quadratic
game), for any given value of q. As in Dockner and Haug (1991) and Fujiwara
(2010), one may as well solve rm hs Hamiltonian. However, this proce-
dure would not illustrate the collapse of the continuum of feedback equilibria
shown in Figure 2, in which the two linear feedback strategies intersect the
steady state locus at the same point.
Figure 2 The linear feedback strategies of rm h under the VER
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Now we can turn to the parametric analysis of this equilibrium point
against the free trade equilibrium described in the previous section. This
can be done by noting that q is at the same time the VER and the free
trade equilibrium output of the home rm, given the full symmetry of the
free trade case. Hence, specifying explicitly the nature of q, which can be
written as2
q = qLFss (+) + (1  ) qT ;  2 (0; 1] (29)
one is accounting for all possible output levels which, from hs standpoint,
represent both its free trade quantity and rm fs VER.
The sign of qLF    q is the sign of the following expression:
 2 (4s+ 3)

3s  +
q
(6s+ )2   12s2

+
+3s

8s+ 5+
q
(6s+ )2   12s2

; (30)
in which the coe¢ cient of  is always negative, as is easily checked. Hence,
(30) is positive (negative) for all  lower (higher) than
b = 3s

8s+ 5+
q
(6s+ )2   12s2

2 (4s+ 3)

3s  +
q
(6s+ )2   12s2
 2 (0; 1) ; (31)
for all s;  > 0.
Therefore, we may formulate our main result as follows:
Proposition 2 For all  2

0; b ; qLF  > q; while for all  2 b; 1i ;
qLF  < q.
The above Proposition says that if the free trade equilibrium output and
the corresponding VER are su¢ ciently close to the output associated with
2The assumption  2 (0; 1] is explicitly meant to exclude the quantity associated with
the tangency point, as the latter is unstable.
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the tangency solution, then the response of rm h to rm fs adoption of
a VER consists in producing more than at the initial free trade equilibrium
(and therefore also more than the VER). If instead the free trade equilibrium
output and the VER are su¢ ciently close to the output associated with the
stable linear feedback strategy, the opposite holds.
Taking into account the stable linear feedback solution in the limit as
s ! 1; Dockner and Haug (1991) nd out that if rm f adopts a VER
at the free trade level, this causes a decrease in industry output through a
decrease in the production of the home rm and a corresponding increase in
the equilibrium price. The ultimate consequence of this mechanism is a prot
increase accruing to the foreign rm, motivating the voluntary adoption of
the VER by the latter. What Fujiwara (2010) adds to the picture is that this
holds for the linear feedback solution for any speed of price adjustment, while
it does not apply in the tangency point under nonlinear feedback strategies.
However, one should note that this nonlinear solution is unstable (indeed, it
is one of the boundaries of a set including innitely many unstable nonlinear
solutions).
What we have found here is that, given the continuum of stable feedback
equilibria characterising the free trade scenario, the same conclusion reached
by Dockner and Haug (1991) emerges in innitely many cases. Yet, the
opposite holds true as well, since for all  2

0; b ; the fact that qLF  > q
means that rm f oods the market as a reaction to the VER. This induces
a decrease in price and in rm fs prots, and therefore the foreign rm has
no incentive to tie its hands to a VER.
In particular, note that in correspondence of b;
q = qOL =
(a  c) (s+ )
4s+ 3
(32)
showing that the reversal of fortunes takes place in correspondence of the
open-loop output, which can be attained through the adoption of a specic
nonlinear feedback strategy, as we know from the previous Section. This
reveals that Fujiwaras (2010) nding, according to which the VER has no
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e¤ects at all under open-loop rules, can be interpreted anew to say that the
absence of precommitment cannot be deemed as the driver of the spontaneous
adoption of a VER. Accordingly, we may reformulate the result spelled out
in Proposition 2 in a more explicit way:
Proposition 3 For all q 2  qT ; qOL ; qLF  > q and this prevents the adop-
tion of the VER at q: Instead, for all q 2  qOL; qLFss (+) ; qLF  < q and this
prompts the adoption of the VER at the free trade level by the foreign rm.
The consequences on rmsprots are intuitive: in the range in which
rm f voluntarily adopts the export restriction at the free trade level, i.e., for
all  2
b; 1i ; the combined e¤ect of industry output reduction and domestic
price reduction makes both rms better o¤ as compared to the initial free
trade equilibrium, irrespective of the speed of price adjustment:
Corollary 4 For all q 2  qOL; qLFss (+) and all s 2 [0;1) ; the adoption of
a VER by the foreign rm also benets the domestic one.
To complete the analysis, we may now briey assess the impact of the
VER on social welfare in the two countries. As for country f , welfare coin-
cides with its rms prots, and therefore obviously the adoption of the VER
is welcome whenever it is spontaneously adopted by the exporting rm itself.
This amounts to saying that, as far as country f is concerned, private and
social incentives are systematically aligned.
When it comes to the welfare consequences in country h, one has to keep
in mind that for all  2
b; 1i ; the steady state industry output associated
with the VER becomes lower than that purchased by consumers in country h
at the symmetric free trade steady state equilibrium. The resulting decrease
in domestic consumer surplus more than o¤sets the increase in the domestic
rms prots and consequently steady state welfare in the home country is
diminished by the adoption of the VER.3
3The detailed calculations are omitted for brevity as they can be easily reproduced
using the expressions of the relevant steady state quantities.
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At rst sight, these considerations may indeed seem pretty obvious. Yet,
they have some relevant bearings on the interpretation of the prediction
yielded by the static version of the Cournot game in Mai and Hwang (1988).
Consider the special case in which  = b. Here, the industry reaches a steady
state through either open-loop strategies or a specic nonlinear feedback one,
in such a way that (i) the two steady states are observationally equivalent,
and (ii) the domestic rms best reply to the VER is the VER itself. More-
over, from Fershtman and Kamien (1987), we know that the limit of the
open-loop equilibrium as either  ! 0 or s ! 1 is the static equilibrium.
Therefore, we see that Mai and Hwangs (1988) irrelevance result is a very
special case (indeed, the limit with no discounting or instantaneous price ad-
justment) of the open-loop scenario. Indeed, the static analysis (Harris, 1985;
Mai and Hwang, 1988) holds that a VER cannot be expected to emerge un-
der quantity competition (conjectural variations being nil) while one should
expect exporting rms to adopt it under price competition (conjectural vari-
ations being negative). In line with Dockner (1987), one may rather say that,
in a quantity-setting di¤erential game, a VER can be adopted if competition
generated by feedback rules is at least as harsh as under open-loop ones.
In such cases (in the present model, for any  2
b; 1i), the negativity of
conjectural variations goes along with output expansion and generates a de-
crease in price analogous to what we are used to observe if rms do compete
in prices.
A few additional words su¢ ce to appreciate what happens for all  2
0; b : In this range, rm f has no incentive to adopt a VER, which is often
labelled as involuntary. This attribute is misleading, as the foreign rm
just does not use the VER. If it did, then domestic welfare and consumer
surplus would increase as compared to the free trade level because of the
output expansion by the home rm, while the e¤ect on the prots of the
latter is ambiguous and depends on the relative size of s and .4
4A static model in which the voluntary restriction on exports makes all subjects better
o¤ is in Syropoulos (1996), where the domestic rms prot increase more than compen-
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5 Concluding remarks
We have generalised the analysis initiated by Dockner and Haug (1991) and
extended by Fujiwara (2010), on the adoption of VERs in the di¤erential
game of intraindustry trade with Cournot behaviour and sticky price dating
back to Simaan and Takayama (1978) and Fershtman and Kamien (1987).
Our approach was meant to point out that the rationale for the VER can be
found in the intensity of competition under feedback rules, which delivers an
e¤ect equivalent to that usually associated with price competition, in such a
way that one can interpret the adoption of a VER on the basis of conjectural
variations (Dockner, 1992).
As a nal remark, we would like to mention that, along the parallel stream
of research dealing with the equivalence between tari¤s and quotas there also
appeared a few contributions investigating this issue in di¤erential games
(Dockner and Haug, 1990; Calzolari and Lambertini, 2006; and Yanase,
2007). The extension of these e¤orts to account for the whole spectrum
of feedback solutions, which may well deliver new insights on a long-standing
issue, is a desirable direction for future research.
sates the decrease in domestic consumer surplus.
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